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Indigenous land tenure insecurity fosters illegal logging in Nicaragua
M. Finley-Brook
University of Richmond, Weinstein Hall, Richmond, Virginia 23173
Email: mbrook@richmond.edu
Summary—Titling of Indigenous common-property lands in eastern Nicaragua is a
necessary base for forest management. Titling alone will not be sufficient to assure
sustainable practices, and the success of demarcation programmes rests on processes of
negotiation leading up to tenure decisions; nevertheless, a review of decades of history in
Indigenous territories suggests that key problems in forest resource administration are
inextricably linked to tenure insecurities, as explorations of current resource disputes in
seven villages demonstrate. Analysis also suggests that ineffective implementation of
Nicaragua’s multiethnic autonomy fosters illegality and resource mismanagement.
Fundamental structural changes to improve inclusion, accountability and transparency are
necessary. Remediation also requires inclusive multiscale negotiations of land claims and
participatory mapping to resolve tenure disputes.
Keywords—illegal logging, land tenure, Indigenous peoples, decentralised policy terrain,
multiscale resolutions
INTRODUCTION
In the North Atlantic Autonomous Region (RAAN) of Nicaragua unsustainable
forestry practices spawn from land tenure insecurity and incomplete or conflictive
devolution of authority after regional autonomy reforms in 1987. While illicit extraction
does not only occur in Indigenous territories or in areas of tenure conflict, illegal hotspots
often exhibit both traits. Land titling is not a magic bullet that can eliminate illegal
logging, but it is an essential starting point. However, on a cautionary note, tenure
insecurity may dampen legal harvests (Bohn and Deacon 2000). Thus, tenure resolution
may encourage future commercial extraction, meaning that along with the need to
strengthen institutions to carry out socially-equitable titling, reforms are also necessary to
assure sustainable forest management (SFM).
Illegality in the forest sector involves a multitude of activities that violate
international, national or subnational legislation from the point of initial extraction to the
final marketing of timber products (Ravenel and Granoff 2004, World Bank 2006b). It is
a dynamic process with complex economic and political roots; as such, it cannot be dealt
with merely through punitive measures as practices will continue to evolve to bypass
norms (Casson and Obidzinski 2002). There may be justifiable interests that spur illegal
logging, especially in areas of tenure insecurity. Moreover, inappropriate or unrealistic
policies may make seemingly legitimate activities illegal. Simultaneously, forest sector
corruption, defined as the unlawful use of public office for private gain (Smith and
Walpole 2005), can lead to cynicism about and even outright rejection of governmental
authority to oversee extraction. These caveats all exist in eastern Nicaragua and while
they are often supported by legitimate criticisms of individual and institutional practices
they are also grounded in tenure conflicts whereby Indigenous leaders have historically
challenged state jurisdiction over their traditional lands (Offen 2003b, 2005).

1

Since the impact of tenure security on forest clearance differs from place to place
(Godoy et al. 1998), researchers must pay specific attention to local and regional
opportunities and constraints. During three years of fieldwork in a series of RAAN
Indigenous villages, the author observed multiscale causes and consequences of both
tenure conflict and illicit logging (Brook 1999, 2005, Finley-Brook 2007a). Solutions will
require attention to various scales (e.g., international, national, regional, municipal,
village, household) as well as multiple sectors (e.g., state, donor, nongovernmental
organisation (NGO), private firms, Indigenous peoples, migrant populations). Forest
policy in eastern Nicaragua has generally been determined at the national level, often
after international consultation, without sufficient prior knowledge of local tenure
regimes and livelihood activities. Policy incompatibilities developed across decades
contributed to an illegal logging crisis starting in 1990 and continuing to the present.
Illegal extraction has repeatedly spurred the Nicaraguan state to impose temporary
moratoriums on extraction of target species or illegal hotspot locations, such as the
RAAN, in an attempt to regain administrative control. Yet, moratoriums are drastic
measures that can have unintended consequences, such as encouraging greater illegal
harvest, over harvesting and corruption (Ascher 1999).
While there has been a log export ban in place in Nicaragua for more than a decade,
95% of logs were exported unprocessed in 2006 (Bodan 2006). Forest policy changes in
2003 to increase domestic processing capacities have not made the gains expected in the
RAAN partially due to tenure insecurities. Logging firm owners openly admit an
unwillingness to locate mills in Indigenous territories due to fear of sabotage from
disenfranchised local populations (pers. comm. 10/12/02, 11/07/02, 05/23/03).1 Poor
transportation, communication and electricity infrastructure in the region is another
investment disincentive that stems from the historic economic marginalisation of
Indigenous populations.
High rates of illegal export cannot be explained by racial inequality alone, although
much illicit timber escapes from inadequately developed port towns in the country’s east
where minority populations are concentrated. Nevertheless, national statistics suggest
corruption and mismanagement inundate the domestic forest sector as a whole. In 2003,
as much as 80 percent of exported lumber was believed to be laundered. Richards et al.
(2003) calculated the annual direct fiscal loss from illegal logging in Nicaragua to be
$2.2-4.0 million and noted that revenues from illegal activities were likely to be
expatriated through foreign lumber intermediaries from countries like Honduras, Costa
Rica, El Salvador, and the Dominican Republic.
Academic attention to the RAAN forest sector has been insufficient. While the
national sector has not been widely covered either, there has been increasing analysis in
recent years. Richards et al. (2003) summarise illegal logging in Nicaragua and
Honduras, although not focusing specifically on Indigenous territories. Legalisation of
illicit lumber is possible at many points during extraction, transport, and processing.
Those responsible for oversight during the harvest and movement of lumber, namely
forestry officials, the police, and the army, accept bribes at transport checkpoints created
to deter illegal trafficking and increase state collection of taxes and fees. As it was
frequently explained to the author by state officials and the general public alike, this
generally involves the acceptance of missing, tampered or reused transport or extraction
1
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permits, but may also include camouflaging illegal timber among legal species or other
commodities.
Lumber merchants interested in illegal wood are attracted to the complex policy
environment in eastern Nicaragua as the involvement of multiple scales and various
sectors makes monitoring difficult and leaves openings for arbitrary interpretation, as will
be shown with examples of village approval processes. INAFOR foresters are responsible
for large tracts of forest in areas where law enforcement is weak. One individual, who
was responsible for six out of the seven case study villages, admitted being unwilling to
strictly enforce forestry laws with mill operators that have a history of violent behaviour
due to fear for his own personal safety (pers. comm. 10/22/02).
The need for multiscale analysis in eastern Nicaragua is clear. National policies have
significant repercussions for regional and local processes. Meanwhile, international
sources contributed 85 percent of national forest sector funds between 1991 and 2004
(Guevara 2004). Foreign land demarcation funding, such as those distributed through the
$32 million World Bank Land Administration Project (2002-2008), is similarly high. Yet,
while drawing attention to international and national processes, this work focuses on the
decentralised policy terrain at the subnational level arguing that lack of understanding of
these processes is a major constraint for land and resource programmes.
Results from various local sites as well as regional analysis over a range of time may
assist in the formulation of culturally-sensitive policies that can simultaneously advance
SFM and social justice. While multisite case studies such as the seven presented here are
important for understanding local ramifications, cross-national comparisons supplement
this critique as they address a wider range of situations. The author draws from Bohn and
Deacon (2000) and Amacher et al. (in press) in reference to changing governance and
tenure regimes, from Contreras-Hermosilla (2003a, 2003b), Ravenel and Granoff (2004)
and World Bank (2006b) on illegal logging, and from Colchester (2004) on issues of
Indigenous rights. Multitemporal studies are also necessary as historical analyses can
help explain current impediments (Larson and Ribot 2007). Thus, the objectives of this
work are (a) to place recent village-based observations in broader theoretical, temporal
and geographical contexts; (b) to examine policy developments in Nicaragua to highlight
the roots of maladapted practices and current decision-making processes; and (c) to
provide suggestions for remediation. In searching for solutions, a focus on conflict
management is determined to be insufficient: it is increasingly necessary to identify
underlying structural constraints in order to resolve conflict (Colchester et al. 2003, 2006,
Larson and Ribot 2007).
Research Methods
This paper utilises data from primary and secondary sources gathered over twelve
years, including three years of fieldwork in a series of Indigenous villages. Research
throughout 2002 and 2003 consisted primarily of participant observation, household
surveys and analysis of ten community forestry projects. The author interviewed 287
individuals in the forestry sector, including foresters, loggers, inspectors, lumber
intermediaries, company owners, state officials, NGO representatives, foreign donors,
and Indigenous leaders. Some of the richest data collection resulted from observation of
community meetings as well as forums for decision-making or reporting at the regional
and national levels.
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Villages located in the forested interior of the RAAN were selected for in-depth
analysis. The most attention was granted to Alamikangban, where the researcher lived.
Fifty household surveys on forest governance were completed in this village, signifying
coverage of more than thirty percent of the households. Significant attention was also
devoted to the proximate villages of Tasbapauni, Tungla, Klarindan, Las Crucetas,
Layasiksa, and Wasakin. All these villages experience tenure insecurity and became
hotspots for illegal logging starting in the 1990s. They later hosted foreign-sponsored
forest development initiatives.
In addition to focus on local process, this research required particular attention to the
intermediary subnational scales, as other researchers working on similar issues in
autonomous regions have suggested (McCarthy 2002, Ashley et al. 2006). In order to
obtain multiscale perspectives, extended periods of research were completed in the
municipal2 and RAAN seats of governance as well as the national capital. The 287
interviews can be broken down by scale: village (25.4%), village bloc (3.1%),3 municipal
(12.2%), regional (22.0%), national (20.2%), and international (17.1%) and by sector:
Indigenous (30.7%), state (28.9%), NGO (22.0%), private (16.3%), and other (2.1%).
The author returned to Nicaragua for a month from 2006-2007 to update earlier
findings. She again sought interviews and information from multiple scales and various
sectors. Collection of state, NGO, media and aid agency reports continues to supplement
fieldwork data.
LATIN AMERICAN LAND TENURE PROGRAMMES
Programmes for the formalisation of tenure rights, often called land ‘regularisation’,
exist throughout Latin America (World Bank 2006a, Deininger 2005). Tenure
stabilisation programmes are tied to the premise that resource commerce, land markets,
and investment security require formally titled, measured, and regulated properties
(Figure 1). Many programmes primarily aim to strengthen the legal and institutional
framework for land registry and cadastre services; however, titling programmes may also
partner social goals, such as rural development, urban services, poverty reduction, or
gender equity though joint titling (World Bank 2006a, IDA/World Bank 2007).
Figure 1: Land Administration Project Justifications
Category
Administrative
effect

Security effect

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Related Objectives
Increase efficiency, cost-effectiveness, transparency and
accessibility of land administration systems
Improve rates of property rights registration
Expand the operation of financial markets
Increase productivity and rates of return from land
Improve the sustainability of resource management
Institutionalise conflict resolution mechanisms
Increase equity through increased bargaining power for

2
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small indigenous and non-indigenous villages.
3
Blocs of shared resource governance among proximate villages are customary in some parts of the
RAAN.
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Collateral effect
Transaction effect

•
•
•
•

traditionally marginalised social groups
Enhance the access of producers to credit
Reduce the real cost of borrowing
Develop real estate and rental markets
Provide a base for payment of environmental services

Subcomponents of Latin American land administration programmes often focus on
Indigenous and Afro-descendent territories due to the widespread problem of tenure
insecurity. Administration improvements in these territories often targets natural resource
management. While structuring payments for environment services (e.g., carbon storage,
oxygen production, and pollutant filtration) in Indigenous territories is a current concern,
there may be less need for real estate transactions in these areas than in other types of
tenure regimes. In eastern Nicaragua the transfer of Indigenous lands is strictly prohibited
and these territories are inalienable through sale, rental, or seizure.4 This may limit the
use of collective property as collateral, given that loan originators could not leverage
property in lieu of payments.
Sensitivity to the cultural implications of property rights change is necessary (Ashley
et al. 2006). Indigenous systems have particular traits that have received preliminary
attention in land administration literature (e.g., Deininger 2005, World Bank 2006a);
nevertheless, attention to customary norms is usually a minimal part of broader studies.
While the understanding of local processes usually remains insufficient, the transfer of
land administration policies from country to country has been widespread based on the
advice of foreign consultants (Offen 2003a, 2003b, 2005).
Collectively-managed lands and areas with customary tenure norms require special
consideration. Customary systems often exhibit bundles of rights whereby multiple
parties claim specific resources, such as water, medicines, fodder or timber (Wiebe and
Meinzen-Dick 1998). Usufruct rights defining the use of agro-forestry resources within
common-property areas may be based on gender, ethnicity, kinship or status. There are
often overlapping formal (de jure) and informal (de facto) rights, which may or may not
be held up in a court of law (Schlager and Ostrom 1992).
Indigenous Land Tenure in Eastern Nicaragua
Indigenous territoriality in eastern Nicaragua is based in a long history of selfgovernance under the Miskitu Kingdom in partnership with British allies well before
incorporation into the Nicaraguan state in 1894. Current land politics combine historical
claims, including those from Indigenous titles granted to small areas by a short-lived
Titling Commission in the years following the 1905 Harrison-Altamirano Treaty,5 and
new terms created by the 1987 Autonomy Statute (Dana et al. 1998; Offen 2003b, 2005).
The Statute arose out of conflict between multiethnic populations and the state in the
1980s. The Sandinista Administration agreed to complete a survey of eastern Nicaragua
as a preliminary base for broad land titling. However, the Indigenous-produced map
claimed ownership to much more than what the Sandinistas anticipated (Hale 1994). As
Indigenous discourses consolidated around the need for historical vindication of land and
4
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resource rights, the relationship between the Sandinistas and Indigenous leaders became
increasingly conflictive. State concerns led to the arrest of several Indigenous leaders in
1981. Upon their release from prison these leaders instigated a massive relocation to
Honduras; underlying tensions escalated into open guerrilla combat and civil war.
In 1987 the Sandinista government granted political autonomy to eastern Nicaragua,
partially as a means to quell violence, after consultation with all five regional ethnic
populations (Hale 1994, Cunningham and Barbeyto 2001). The Miskitu, Mayangna, and
Rama are Indigenous peoples while the Creole and Garifuna are Afro-descendent
populations. The interior of the RAAN, covered in this research, hosts the two most
populous ethnic groups in eastern Nicaragua, the Miskitu and Mayangna.
The Autonomy Statute created North and South Atlantic Autonomous Regions, which
combine to cover nearly 50 percent of Nicaragua but contain less than 11 percent of the
total national population (Roldan 2001). The Statute was adopted into the national
constitution and it recognised common-property land tenure as well as other cultural and
economic rights. It stated that Indigenous populations would benefit from resource
extraction from their territories, but in accordance with national development, which has
taken precedence over local demands partially due to population imbalances between
eastern and western Nicaragua.
Communal land holdings dominate the landscape in eastern Nicaragua (Dana et al.
1998). These lands fall under the broad category of common-property tenure (sensu
Ostrom 1990) due to shared resource use and governance. Nevertheless, the situation in
eastern Nicaragua is highly dynamic and violates the basic characteristics of robust
common-property institutions, which Ostrom defines as requiring clear boundaries and
membership. Schlager and Ostrom (1992) suggest that generally communal lands may
support the right of management (to regulate internal use patterns), but not the rights of
exclusion (to determine who will have access) or alienation (to sell or lease lands).
However, it should be noted that communal systems in Asia, Africa and Latin America
may be significantly different, making it difficult to define international ‘best practices’
for demarcation or resource management (Fitzpatrick 2005).
The inability to exclude others can be a major constraint to sustainable resource use.
Migration often increases resource extraction pressure (Amacher et al. in press), such as
in frontier region along the interior of eastern Nicaragua where colonists enter the
Indigenous periphery from the heavily populated mestizo6 core. Logging was used to
demonstrate tenure, as clearing land is seen an ‘improvement’ and could make a settler
eligible for an agrarian reform title. However, under the 2003 Demarcation Law, it was
determined that all settlers that had arrived within untitled land after 1987 would need to
arrange a rental contract with Indigenous ‘owners’ in order to stay on the land, or if they
chose to leave could sell it and any improvements back to villages. While few steps have
been taken toward implementation of the Demarcation Law, processes are even more
conflictive than they had been prior to this policy shift, which is viewed widely by
colonists as unfair. Indigenous leaders would like migrants to leave, but they remain
uncertain where to find funds to indemnify colonists for property (pers. comm. 12/20/06).
New tenure policies aimed at enhancing tenure security may actually contribute to
greater conflict if they lack implementation procedures, a major problem in eastern
Nicaragua. Legislative shifts often falter for years before the state drafts the reglamentos
6
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(codes) that mandate how it will be enforced, leaving procedures open to interpretation.
The reglamentos of the 1987 Autonomy Statute were undefined for fifteen years.
Nevertheless, the initial Autonomy Statute did reinforce traditional governance in the
form of the sindiko (natural resource and land overseer), wihta (judge), and Council of
Elders, and these leaders were slowly brought into state forest permitting processes, with
mixed results. Only the signature of the sindiko was legally necessary in subsequent
forestry norms. Contreras-Hermosilla (2003b) has noted that reducing the scope of
individual control is often important to limit illegality. In the case of village sindikos,
decision-making transitioned from community-based public forums to clandestine
negotiations whereby firms transported the sindiko to a (semi-)urban center and paid for
accommodations before coming away with a signature permitting extraction (FinleyBrook 2007a). In logging concessions in the seven villages under analysis, the researcher
consistently found that community members usually did not know if the sindiko had
signed any agreement. The few people that were aware of possible contracts did not
know how much the sindiko had received for extraction from communal property. With
this lack of transparency and accountability, it is no surprise that corruption of sindikos
was widespread (Brook 2005).
After fifteen years of mismanagement, subsequent state policies attempted to address
the situation, although the 2003 reglamentos of the Autonomy Statute inspired little
reform. It was the 2003 Demarcation Law that established a Communal Assembly to
oversee commercial resource extraction and a Territorial Assembly to oversee
subsistence use. However, entrenched patterns of elite capture were difficult to reverse
and competing mandates fed discord. While the Communal Assembly was an important
step toward the recognition of customary public decision-making, the continuation of the
sindiko’s role to sign off on timber extraction exacerbated conflict when the community
forum was grafted on top. Moreover, the multivillage Territorial Assembly of communal
authorities such as sindikos and wihtas (in contract with the public Communal Assembly
open to all members of a single village) did not exist in most locations historically and
was formulated by the state without consulting village leaders, which lead to contestation.
New tenure policies may increase conflict if they counter local customs, norms and
histories (Deininger 2005). Yet, RAAN customary oversight procedures are also
inadequate because they were created when there were not a large number of mestizo
colonists, pressure on leaders from large timber concessions providing minimal local
employment,7 or multi-million dollar forest development projects premised upon
community participation. These extra-regional pressures make resource governance more
complex.
Intra-regional processes are also multifarious. After Indigenous migration in search of
wage employment, relocation from war, and changes in village locations after disease
outbreaks or natural disasters, current tenure claims are highly dynamic and often
contradictory. RAAN perspectives shift depending on a person or household’s village
alliance, family claim, ethnicity, age, or date of arrival to an area.
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There have been large-scale foreign timber concessions in eastern Nicaragua for centuries, but historic
concessionaires hired local populations, and therefore maintained popular support, but by law they did not
need local approval. Today, companies work through intermediaries or arrive with outside workers and
large machinery. If legal norms are followed, they should harvesting permission from the sindiko.
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Subnational institutions, specifically named in the 2003 Demarcation Law as the main
titling authorities, must demarcate land even though consensus does not exist and there is
little experience with conflict resolution. The Autonomy Statute created several regional
institutions that were to oversee local processes, but these have been severely
underfunded since they initiated in 1990 (Acosta 2007). The RAAN government relies
almost entirely on economic transfers from the central government and officials complain
that they only receive back a small portion of the resource extraction fees and taxes that
are sent to the capital city (pers. comm. 11/13/03). Additional problems, particularly in
the initial administrations, arose from near total lack of government experience. A further
constraint has been that Indigenous officials have lost the support of traditionalists, who
strongly criticise any involvement in party politics, which is required to win regional
seats (Brook 2005). Traditionalists point to a long list of compromises that Indigenous
politicians have made to pursue political alliances. Meanwhile, civil war hostilities from
the 1980s based in land tenure conflict between Indigenous and state sectors have never
been adequately redressed. In addition to feeding on-going resentment toward the central
government,8 this has contributed to RAAN polarisation since political parties were
active on different sides of the war.
Formal tenure rights for Indigenous populations would lessen central government
control over timber concessions as it would supersede the legal fallback that defines all
untitled land as state land. In recent years, international institutions have attempted to
step in to rectify the Nicaraguan government’s violation of Indigenous rights by delaying
titling. The Organisation of American States (OAS) insisted on demarcation after hearing
the case of the village of Awas Tingni. In the mid-1990s, President Chamorro granted a
thirty-year 62,000 hectare timber concession that intercepted the land claims of this
Mayangna community (Brook 1999). Villagers brought unsuccessful cases to national
and regional courts. Then, working with international lawyers, they took a case to the
OAS Inter-American Court for Human Rights arguing that Nicaragua was violating its
own laws on Indigenous communal rights as well as international norms protecting
Indigenous rights. In 2001, when the Court handed down a sentence in favour of Awas
Tingni, an important international precedent was set. In spite the lack of a de jure land
title, the Court recognised communal land as a human right for Indigenous peoples and
ordered titling of Awas Tingni’s de facto claims (Brook 2005).
Six years after the OAS Court’s ruling Awas Tingni’s territory remains untitled. In a
initial national commission (2001-2003) created by the state to negotiate the village
boundaries, there were thirteen state lawyers and only two representing the Indigenous
village, along with three communal leaders (Brook 2005). This lopsided arrangement led
to impasse due to the state’s attempt to overpower Indigenous voices.
With the 2003 Demarcation Law, the central government passed Awas Tingni titling
over to regional institutions, but disagreement between Mayangna villagers and Miskitu
settlers, who arrived through a Civil War resettlement programme, continued to delay
resolution. The OAS decision required saneamiento, or ethnic cleansing of targeted
‘others’ from the land claim, which generated conflict between the historical use by Awas
Tingni and the more recent land acquisition by two blocs of Miskitu villages known as
Tasba Raya and Diez Comunidades. That the OAS only heard the perspective of Awas
8
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Tingni, in spite of the fact that the other villages were living on the land, shows the need
to more fully understand local processes before defining rights.
The Awas Tingni situation is yet another example of the overlap between logging
conflict and land tenure discord. The desire to control timber access combined with
illegal logging to fuel the land conflict between the two ethnic groups, which at times led
to violence (Brook 2005). Until 2007 regional officials were unable to negotiate even an
informal agreement between the Miskitu and Mayangna claimants, which demonstrates
the necessity for stronger regional institutions, with greater funding to carry out improved
participatory consultation with villages and more training in conflict resolution, to deal
with problems expeditiously.
THE NICARAGUAN LOGGING SECTOR
The interrelation of tenure conflict and forestry programmes in the RAAN through
time shows how self-governance constraints continued well beyond the regional
autonomy designation in 1987. There was a reversal of Indigenous power following the
military-backed incorporation of the eastern region into the Nicaragua state in 1894.
After centuries of Indigenous and British trade, “an influx of American speculators and
tropical tramps” came to eastern Nicaragua (Parsons 1955: 54). US mining and logging
concessions covered the region until 1979 (Hale 1994): these were determined through
the central government without Indigenous consultation. Policy focused on assuring tax
revenue to the state and reforestation requirements were routinely avoided with payments
to high-level officials (Vilas 1990).
Rapid extraction of big-leaf mahogany (Swietenia macrophylla) and Caribbean pine
(Pinus caribea) in first half of the twentieth century was followed by initial sector
development in the 1950s. Plans to modernise forest production consolidated under the
National Development Institute (INFONAC), founded in 1953 to funnel international
assistance to agriculture and industry (Vernooy et al. 1991). By the mid-1970s
INFONAC holdings and concessions covered 11 percent of the country (BCN 1974).
More than 83 percent of INFONAC holdings were officially considered state lands, yet
most INFONAC areas were historically claimed by Indigenous populations (Vilas 1990).
The Northeastern Forestry Project was a major INFONAC programme. With foreign
technical support, officials established pine plantations, reforestation, and fire control.
The project’s central offices were located in the capital city of Managua and the
Indigenous populations living in the pine plains were merely hired as workers. Some
continued to burn annually to support traditional livelihoods. Burns provide palatable
grasses that attract wild game and livestock was set to graze among the trees or in areas
that had been deforested and converted to grasslands. In addition, local populations
increased their earnings when they were hired to fight the fires they set (Vilas 1990).
After the overthrow of the Somoza dictatorship in 1979, the Sandinista Front for
National Liberation (FSLN) confiscated foreign-owned companies. The People’s
Forestry Corporation took charge of lumber firms, but forestry in the Caribbean region
faced land tenure conflict. Indigenous populations demanded proceeds from extraction
and denounced the nationalisation of their lands in proposed forest reserves (Sollis 1989).
In 1983, after the onset of a civil war, rebels supported by Indigenous populations burned
a large area of reforested pine within the Northeastern Forestry Project on lands claimed
by local populations. The state tried to continue fire control programmes, but they
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eventually ended in 1985 due to lack of funding. Military expenditures for the war were a
major drain on state resources.
When the Sandinistas were voted out of power at the end of the 1980s, President
Chamorro (1990-1997) initiated neoliberal economic policies to reduce barriers to trade,
shrink public expenditures, encourage privatisation, and increase exportation. She granted
numerous forestry concessions to foreign companies. In many cases these were located
within Indigenous territories, but were granted without consultation with local leaders (de
Camino 1997, Brook 2005).
The rate of illegal extraction became so severe that in 1992 Chamorro passed a
moratorium on all commercial logging, but the ban excluded permits that had received
prior approval. The moratorium did not halt illegal extraction and was soon reversed. By
1996 the National Assembly stepped in to try to limit natural resource concessions after
more than a hundred formal requests for exploration and exploitation of mining, fishing,
or forestry were made in one month. National councilors passed a law that would have
restricted the types and amounts of concessions, but the president vetoed parts stating that
it was bad for the economy (Brook 2005). Starting in the mid-1990s, several logging
concessions greater than 30,000 hectares in Indigenous territories drew international
attention. Local villagers appealed extraction in national and international courts, but
cases proved to be slow to remediate problems.
Logging companies commonly maintained legal concessions as a front, but earned
most of their profit from supplemental extraction of valuable species outside their
permitted areas (Brook 2005). The state began decommissioning and auctioning illegal
lumber, but this usually ended up back in the hands of the extractor who had harvest it
illicitly, so the auction became known as a method to legalise lumber without completing
an expensive management plan.
The next Nicaraguan President, Arnoldo Alemán (1997-2001), continued with large
multinational timber concessions. One company, Solcarsa, cut trees outside its approved
area, installed a processing plant without corresponding environmental permits, and
broke lumber purchasing agreements with Indigenous communities (Controlería General
de la República 1998) before the Supreme Court order its concession area to be cancelled
due to violations of regional law under the Autonomy Statute (Brook 1999). Two other
large RAAN firms, Madensa and Prada, who soon took over Solcarsa’s mills and
operations, had legal forest harvest areas but preferred to purchase illicit lumber so they
did not have to finance a forester to write a management plan and avoided taxes (Brook
2005).
In 1997, the president placed a moratorium on the harvest of three species for five
years: big-leaf mahogany, Spanish cedar (Cedrela odorata) and pochote (Bombacopsis
quinatum). According to an INAFOR official, extraction of these species rose as a result
of increased profit on the black market; meanwhile, confiscated lumber was auctioned
(pers. comm. 10/22/02). Vast numbers of trees were harvested from Indigenous
territories. Although the corruption of local leaders was widespread, in many instances
harvest occurred without local approval (Brook 2005). Using timber intermediaries, firms
funded selective harvest of these species. They also frequently paid mestizo colonists for
trees.
After Hurricane Mitch in 1998, an Operative Forestry Plan (POF 98) was passed
making it legal to extract blown-down lumber. In the midst of the moratorium, extractors
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used POF 98 permits to cut big-leaf mahogany and Spanish cedar. An inventory of
damaged trees in either coniferous or broadleaf forests was never carried out. According
to an INAFOR official, “POF was put in place because of the moratorium of Alemán. It
had nothing to do with [Hurricane] Mitch…most extractors would just arrive with list and
they would say that they had more down than they really did” (pers. comm. 10/22/02).
POF 98 fees were small compared to the value of the lumber, which was predominately
mahogany: $35 per cubic metre. Corruption contributed to loss of state income: the fees
collected were only 60 percent of what they should have been (INAFOR 2001a).
When President Alemán cancelled the moratorium he instated the Autonomous
Region Plan 2000 (PRA 2000) to legalise vast amounts of harvested mahogany (INAFOR
2001b). In the three months between when PRA 2000 was announced and an inventory of
felled lumber occurred, INAFOR officials believe thousands of additional trees were
harvested (pers. comm. 10/22/02). They also suggest that foresters recorded higher
numbers of trees in return for payment; extractors were then able to cut even more wood
(pers. comm. 10/22/02, 12/12/02). Like POF 98, the majority of PRA 2000 applications
came from non-Indigenous extractors harvesting in Indigenous territories.
President Alemán created other disincentives to legality. In 1999 and 2001, he
increased fees and taxes on the extraction of precious species. He justified this as a means
to reduce harvest, but fees for legalising illicit lumber remained low. Illegal extraction
was viewed as the most cost-effective option (Richards et al. 2003). In contrast, legal
operations required costly planning and permitting. Moreover, state approval processes
for concessions took months, meaning that companies could miss the short extraction
period during the dry season waiting for permits. Since so many operations functioned
illegally, firms justified their own illicit behaviors as necessary to compete.
In the midst of these administrative problems, there was an influx of aid into
Nicaragua’s forest sector in the late 1990s. The World Bank was a main funding source
for a Forestry Promotion Office (PROFOR) (1997-2003). While the majority of
PROFOR pilot projects involved plantations in the west of Nicaragua, a few Caribbean
projects created community sawmills in Indigenous villages, like Layasiksa and Las
Crucetas, in spite of land tenure disputes. The World Bank reversed its earlier ban of
financing extraction from natural forests, but only if critical habitats were protected and
aid recipients worked towards Forest Stewardship Council certification. Support for is
process came primarily from the RAAN-based office of World Wildlife Fund (WWF)
that advised specific indigenous forestry projects. The three villages and village blocs
that WWF worked with extensively became some of the most successful in regulating
extraction, but faced on-going problems with marketing and land tenure conflict.
While there have been global forest management advances as a result of certified
forestry, important concerns exist about equity in operations (Thornber 2003). Most
certificates are in developed countries and are dominated by industrial enterprises. Small
firms may have less access to information about certified markets, less ability to pay
additional costs as a result of certification requirements, and may not produce at costs
competitive with industrial growers. Certification in Indigenous territories is rare.
Untitled communal holdings cannot receive certification, eliminating the majority of
eastern Nicaragua for eligibility for these programmes, although irregularities can occur.
In the first FSC-approved area in Nicaragua, initiated in 2001, untitled Indigenous lands
were illegally privatised into a series of small plots held by non-Indigenous populations
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just prior to the entrance of the logging company (Finley-Brook 2007a). Most of these
titles were illegal because the agrarian reform policies under which ownership was
granted required that recipients make land improvements and live on the plot for years.
Interviews in the area and a review of firm reports revealed that some landowners
received their titles the same day they signed the land over to the company and that others
had never lived on their lands. FSC certifiers were unaware of these administrative flaws
and flew to the concession area by helicopter, meaning that they did not talk to the
Indigenous populations living further inland that have historic de facto claims to this
land.9
Under the next Nicaraguan President, Enrique Bolaños (2002-2007), a Law of
Conservation, Promotion, and Sustainable Forest Sector Development passed in 2003,
after being stalled for nearly a decade. INAFOR officials recognise that this occurred due
to political manoeuvering, even noting that opposition to the law was inspired by the fact
that stronger forestry norms reducing illicit behavior would hit National Assembly
officials “in their pockets” (pers. comm. 11/12/03). Legislative delays due to elite benefit
from illegal logging are an international problem cited by Contreras-Hermosilla (2003a).
The 2003 Forestry Law briefly mentioned forest certification and environmental
services as ways to create positive incentives for better management. Yet, a main focus
was an increase in punitive sanctions. Instead of only decommissioning illegal lumber,
INAFOR could also auction the vehicles used in transport. Individuals or companies that
had wood auctioned were prohibited from purchasing the same lumber. In addition, to
reduce corruption, private foresters were granted responsibilities over specific
concessions. These regents were to provide a supplementary oversight mechanism and
alleviate state overload. However, according to a regional INAFOR official, since they
earned their fees directly from logging firms, abuses of power merely shifted from the
public sector to the private (pers. comm. 01/08/07). Meanwhile, overextended INAFOR
officers were now required to track yet another series of transactions inundated with
inconsistencies.
Another change in the 2003 law was that environmental impact assessments (EIAs)
were required for all extraction plans larger than 500 hectares. Previously this was
required only for those greater than 5 000 hectares. Since EIAs are expensive, extractors
began to partition larger areas into segments of 499 hectares or less, arguing that they
could not afford the additional assessment given low lumber prices on national markets
(pers. comm. 12/20/07). INAFOR officials have criticised that the numerous small
concessions are hard to monitor, especially since they are often sold between firms and
intermediaries (pers. comm. 12/21/07).
The 2003 Forestry Law did not promote SFM to the extent expected. Attention to
petty corruption continued to distract from the problem of vested interests among
policymakers. Richards et al. (2003) note that it was easier to blame Nicaragua’s poor for
illegality than elites. Uneven application of forest laws meant that large firms with strong
political connections got away with practices that smaller companies and individual
extractors could not.
With ongoing illegality, in 2006 President Bolaños declared a state of emergency in
the RAAN. He eliminated domestic or minor plans (planes mínimos), which are smaller
than 10 hectares, due to the difficulty of oversight. However, these smaller plans were the
9

The FSC certification body was Scientific Certification Systems.
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ones that Indigenous populations were most likely to pursue if they were to seek state
permits at all. Local populations cannot commercially log legally, even at low rates, if
they cannot afford to pay a forester to write a management plan under a formal
concession. There have only been three RAAN Indigenous forestry projects, discussed in
the next section, that provide exceptions to this trend. In addition to the lack of
investment capital, inadequate knowledge of state permitting system creates Indigenous
dependency on outside firms10 or encourages individuals to extract illegally.
Almost immediately following the announcement of the forestry emergency,
Preseident Bolaños created a new moratorium on extraction of six species, including bigleaf mahogany, for ten years. The eighteen articles in the moratorium lacked precision11
and violated prior legislation, so state foresters were uncertain which laws to apply (pers.
com. 01/08/07). The ban also, once again, blocked exports of all unprocessed wood (raw
trunks, squared timber or rough-cut boards) with the goal to force industrialisation.
However, additional financial support is necessary to make this transition as few
domestic companies, particularly Indigenous enterprises, have the capacity or capital to
process lumber for legal export.
LOCAL RAMIFICATIONS
The previous section depicts RAAN processes, but does not adequately shed light on
ramifications for Indigenous villages. During fieldwork, the author repeatedly observed
the following processes (Brook 1999, 2005):
(a) increased discord in development projects or logging concessions after changes in
resource access violated customary tenure norms;
(b) insignificant knowledge on the part of state officials, firms and donors about the
specific reasons for and implications of local tenure conflicts;
(c) corruption of individual leaders;
(d) predatory logging based on the notion that it is better to extract now while tenure
is disputed than risk the chance that titling will cull future opportunities;
(e) limited benefit to non-elite local populations from legal and illegal logging.
Future negotiations of land demarcation and titling will likely be protracted in each of
the seven cases discussed. Until tenure conflicts are resolved, SFM remains at risk
(Figure 2). Although similarities exist with many other RAAN villages, not every
community experiences the same degree of conflict. While tenure insecurity fosters
disagreement between Indigenous villages and outsiders, it also feeds inter- and intracommunity discord.
Figure 2: Tenure Insecurity and Logging in Select Villages
Actors
Alamikangban

Tenure Conflict
Forest reserve boundaries

Results
Extraction from and annual fires

10

RAAN Indigenous populations involved in timber transactions with non-local actors receive 3.4 - 7.3
percent of the total value of the wood on the national market when they sell trees by the foot (Larson 2006).
11
For example, there was a ban on all cedar, even though Carapa guianensis is abundant. There was lack
of clarity concerning which pine species could be harvested from various regions.
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& state
Klarindan &
ex-combatants
Klarindan &
Dos Amigos
Layasiksa &
Kukalaya
Layasiksa &
colonists

Former president awarded land to
civil war ex-combatants without
consulting previous land claimants
Two Indigenous villages claim an
area that both have used
historically
Two Indigenous villages dispute a
logging concession that was first
awarded to Kukalaya and later
transferred to Layasiksa
An Indigenous village and mestizo
migrants dispute land rights

Las Crucetas & An Indigenous village formulated
a large timber concession on lands
surrounding
partially held by other villages;
villages
Las Crucetas is a new settlement
predominately from one extended
family, although the father has
historic claims to the area
Tasbapauni
Illegal land sale to a mestizo
rancher
Tungla &
colonists
Tungla &
logging firms

Wasakin & a
foreigner of
Arabic descent

Indigenous village and mestizo
migrants dispute lands; former
sindikos were accused of illegal
land sales
Amorphous logging firms sold and
traded logging permits without
community knowledge; firms
extracted trees outside of legal
concession area.
Indigenous village disputes a land
purchase in an area of timber
extraction.

within protected area
Conflict over a logging
concession with inequitable
distribution of proceeds
Dos Amigos supports extraction
while Klarindan does not.
Without demarcation, opponents
have no means to stop extraction
Management plans had to be
rewritten; illegal logging has
occurred on the part of the
disenfranchised community
Unregulated forest clearing and
timber extraction near
homesteads; situation exploded
into violence with kidnappings
and exchange of fire
One village (and its dominant
family) has unequal control of
logging and mill operations and
receives inequitable benefit

Loss of communal land;
transferred lands were cleared for
cattle
Violence has risen between and
among colonists and villagers.
Thousands of illegal mahogany
trees were abandoned after legal
transport permits could not be
obtained.
Situation is complicated by state
offices siding with the foreigner
and villagers illegally cutting
timber from the sold land

The specific background in each situation is highly complex. While every case cannot
be covered in detail, a few illustrative examples will demonstrate additional concerns.
There has been only one instance in the RAAN, in the village of Las Crucetas, where
Indigenous populations have self-organised legal extraction under a large concession on
communal lands. In this case foreign investment and consultation was imperative, but the
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initiative came from an Indigenous family; however this led to tenure conflicts in 2003
between neighboring villages (Figure 2). At the time RAAN officials reported having no
knowledge of these disputes (Finley-Brook 2007a). National and international
stipulations to release project funds only required them to organise participatory
consultation exercises in Las Crucetas, where the mill was to be located. The author
attended municipal and local meetings were tenure problems were openly disputed. The
claims presented at this local scale contradicted the knowledge of decision-making
officials in the regional seat 200 kilometres away.
Two other foreign-sponsored RAAN projects maintain they have organised
Indigenous forestry (Brook 2005). Although Layasiksa’s land was eventually recognised
(Figure 2), the forest concession is officially owned by Prada, a multinational corporation
with a history of Indigenous rights violations and conflict with the RAAN government
(Brook 1999, 2005). With extensive technical support and training from WWF and
financial backing from foreign donors, Layasiksa community members improved their
timber contract terms with Prada and other extractors. Yet, the RAAN logging
moratorium, the cancellation of Prada’s certification in 2006 due to on-going violations
of FSC standards (Smartwood 2007), and the termination of WWF’s support in 2007
make future extraction and marketing uncertain.
Limi-Nawâh touts itself as the first Indigenous Corporation in Nicaragua. Since 2002
this Canadian-sponsored forestry project worked with 16 villages including
Alamikangban, Wasakin, Klarindan, Tungla, and Tasbapauni (Brook 2005). After initial
timber extraction characterised by delays, Limi-Nawâh was restructured in 2006 and the
local administration structure established in 2003 was eliminated. For the period of 20072009 a Canadian investor, and a key administrator of the project from the start, has
assumed primary control. If Limi-Nawâh emerges from bankruptcy in spite of the RAAN
moratorium on most of the species the project planned to extract, this investor suggests
he will then divest and pass administration back to village populations (pers. comm.
12/19/06).
From 1999-2003, prior to and at the start of Limi-Nawâh, untitled claims in a series
of indigenous villages, including Alamikangban, Tasbapauni, Tungla and Klarindan,
came into conflict with another proposed foreign development project. In 1974, four
North Americans had purchased land claimed by twelve villages. The title to the 60,000
hectares they purchased was originally bought in 1908 by a private shipping company. In
2000, RAAN courts backed the foreigners’ claim to the land (Brook 2005). Appeals to a
different RAAN court after the 2003 Demarcation Law reversed this decision and
annulled the foreigners’ title. This example suggests a fundamental advance in
Indigenous land protection with regard to de facto claims.
Over the years of this tenure conflict, the impacted villages became internally
divided. Since the foreigners that had purchased the private land title offered jobs in a
proposed reforestation and ecotourism project, some community members supported
them in spite of the threat to their own communal lands. In 2002, a household survey in
Alamikangban showed that approximately ten percent would sell communal land rights
in exchange for limited (seasonal or temporary) work opportunities (Brook 2005). Others
would consider selling if benefits were larger. This situation reflects the fact that villagers
have come to see communal resources in economic terms, in spite of restrictions on the
transfer of lands under the Autonomy Statute.
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Alamikangban had registered a land title with regional offices in 1998 after a
proposed cattle ranching project provided leaders economic support to pursue the
formalisation of their historic land claims (Brook 2005). When the regional court case
sided in 2000 with the foreigners discussed above, this title was revoked. The central
office of INAFOR utilised the same annulled title as the basis for logging permits until
2003. When the author asked officials in 2002 how they could use a document without
legal validity, they admitted having no knowledge of the regional court case (pers. comm.
12/11/02). Later, as INAFOR devolved oversight to regional offices, it was argued that
there would be more knowledge about tenure conflicts, but the lack of transparency in
regional courts and poor dissemination of information are continuing impediments
(Acosta 2007).
Regional and national officials, as well as international donors, relayed dissatisfaction
about local resource management in nearly every interview conducted for this research.
In spite of the potentially inconclusive nature of the clandestine transactions described
below, the goal of these narratives is to show the lack of local regulation. In 2002 when
the author approached a village Elder in an Alamikangban with copies of INAFOR
documents that touted his name as a co-owner of a forestry concession with a national
logging firm, he expressed surprise. Whether this was due to his being totally unaware of
being named as a co-owner, as he claimed, or as a result of the written proof
involucrating him in the concession that other villagers openly protested, is unresolved.
Either way, collective property was not being administered transparently. The illiterate
leader asked the author to read him the concession document. His difficulty at
understanding basic legal terms suggested that he would need additional training to
comprehend the terms of the contract (see Brook 1999 for similar conclusions from
research in the village of Betania). Legal support for Indigenous leaders appears
necessary during negotiations with logging firms, but this cannot occur if processes
remain clandestine. Moreover, lawyers expecting due payment for services are unlikely
to work in areas as remote and poverty-stricken as Alamikangban.
Logging firm owners working in the RAAN frequently claim that they are victims of
manipulation on the part of Indigenous leaders (pers. comm. 10/12/02, 11/07/02,
05/23/03). In-depth observations suggested that the hidden nature of transactions with
village leaders may at times backfire. By law, sindikos should receive a small stumpage
fee (e.g., $0.15-$0.35 per board foot) for lumber extracted commercially from communal
land, yet this price is not standardised between villages and depends on the market price
of particular species being cut and the negotiation skills and oversight ability of the
sindiko.12 From 2001-2003 the author observed a series of Alamikangban community
protests against the same firm that listed the above Elder as a co-owner in one of its many
concession areas. As the details of the events unfolded and the author interviewed the
individuals involved it appeared increasingly likely that the conflict originated from the
sindiko misleading other villagers about payments he received in order to hide the fact he
was being compensated but not sharing proceeds. The result was that villagers directed
their anger at the non-local concession owner, who had no proof of stumpage payments
he insisted he had paid to the sindiko at regular intervals.
12

Historically stumpage fees created a type of emergency social fund that could be distributed to needy
families, widows and orphans. More recently sindikos have tended to use stumpage fees as a payment for
their services.
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INDIGENOUS RIGHTS AND SUSTAINABLE FOREST MANAGEMENT
Nicaraguan policy changes after 2003 aimed to support Indigenous rights and
improve forest management, but the two goals were not sufficiently linked. The changes
in policy and enforcement, while resolving some problems, contributed to the creation of
new ones. This is similar to the conflicts created through devolution in the Autonomy
Statute, a progressive law with positive intentions that inspired contradictory results.
Detailed analysis of the results of these laws leads to two central findings (a) there is an
urgent need for better understanding of local and regional processes, and (b) structural
reforms are required, rather than grafting new legislation on top of ineffective norms.
Multiscale Solutions to Address Illegal Logging
Decentralisation of Nicaraguan forest administration has been encouraged to improve
Indigenous involvement in forest governance. High levels of Indigenous participation in
the regional and municipal governments contrasts with the central government. However,
elite capture, corruption and abuses of power spread to all governance scales (Brook
1999, 2005). If one official or state entity was not open to pay-offs they could be outmanoeuvered by public-private alliances at another scale. Companies took advantage of
the fact that each level was poorly informed about activities at other scales. Improved
communication among scales through cross-scale alliances is necessary to address these
constraints (Finley-Brook 2007a).
Given the documented forestry potential (Roldan 2001, Guevara 2004), RAAN
commercial logging should continue, but it will need to be fundamentally restructured.
Most communal forests have been high-graded,13 meaning that the most valuable species
have been selectively harvested, often to the point where their natural regeneration is at
risk. As a regional INAFOR officer warned local RAAN loggers in 2003, “You have 25
species that could be harvested, but now you are only cutting mahogany…Who is going
to come all this way to buy only ‘white’ wood14 when that is all that remains?”
Livelihood alternatives to illegal logging are necessary. Few opportunities for legal
extraction currently exist in Indigenous territories, and most have been dampened with
the passage of the forest moratorium. Both historically and contemporarily villagers have
predominately supported themselves from agriculture, small livestock herds, hunting and
gathering. Commercial logging has a long history in the RAAN, but it has usually only
been a major source of village income when outside companies or intermediaries initiate
or encourage extraction. While all seven case studies villages have a percentage of the
population that rely on commercial logging, making up approximately 10% of male
household heads in Alamikangban (Brook 2005), this number waxes and wanes. If there
are no markets, Indigenous populations generally only log for subsistence needs.
However, in recent years, with the loss of agricultural crops from frequent flooding and
population pressures on land rotation cycles, loggers have been more persistent about
looking for illegal avenues to sell trees. A village logger captured this general sentiment

13

There are many areas where only mahogany and Spanish cedar have been cut. Extensive commercial
extraction would require expensive drainage and road-building as seasonal wetlands reduce accessibility.
14
Nicaragua does not generally use the international categorisation of soft and hardwood. The majority of
wood is considered “white”. “Red” woods, such as mahogany and Spanish cedar, are increasingly sparse.
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in 2003, “We are going to keep cutting because there is no other work and the
agricultural harvests are not like they were.”
At regional and national level, fundamental forest sector reforms are necessary to
create checks and balances. However, Contreras-Hermosilla (2003a, 2003b) states that
the timing and sequencing of reforms is important. In the case of Nicaragua, reformed
disclosure rules for all state and communal leadership positions will be necessary. Better
recordkeeping could combine with industrywide codes of conduct to assist state oversight
(World Bank 2006b), but many firms in the RAAN are unwilling to voluntarily commit
to uphold the law. Reforms of sanction-oriented laws may need to provide additional
incentives for positive behaviour before it becomes part of accepted regional and national
culture. Contreras-Hermosilla (2003a, 2003b) also suggests need to make regulations
simpler, and where possible, fewer in number in order to make legislation more
enforceable and penalization more realistic. Then it may be necessary to circulate a
blacklist of companies that continue to break the law. In Nicaragua, stipulations such as
this would require a rupture of intimate ties between large logging firms and their
political and financial allies in state institutions as well as national media.
Once the above reforms are in place, independent monitoring and certification may be
more successful. In eastern Nicaragua, tenure conflicts, the reversal of FSC certification
in the case of Prada, and on-going difficulties to find markets for certified lumber had led
to cynicism about this oversight mechanism among groups interviewed. However, as
these constraints continue to be resolved, certification discussions can provide a forum
for community education and improved public awareness and information access that
could encourage collaboration between external experts and local populations. There
have been a positive steps encouraged by international groups, such as WWF and
Rainforest Alliance, as well as national groups like Nicambiental, to orchestrate efforts
between NGOs, universities, donors, private firms and state agencies. This cooperation
reduces overlap between programs and contributes to a search for more comprehensive
solutions with less institutional, political or technical bias than frequently occurred when
these actors worked in isolation.
Many World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank loans for community
development have targeted Indigenous territories. As part of national mandates these
programmes predominately focused on improving the state’s balance of payment through
increased export products (leather, meat, palm oils, nontraditional agroforestry) and
improved marketing channels (Finley-Brook 2007b). At termination of funding, projects
had generally not resolved tenure insecurities, human development constraints, or
governance weaknesses, partially due to unrealistic five-year funding cycles. Local elites
often assumed positions on advisory commissions or attend stakeholder meetings as a
means to gain access to information and resources (Brook 2005). These individuals did
not always represent the interests of the larger community but their input often formed
the backbone of local consultations. State, donor, or business representatives working in
Indigenous villages need to utilise open, inclusive public assemblies to provide
information, answer questions, or receive input.
Community forestry programmes in the RAAN have received funding and technical
support from a series of multiscale institutions, including multi- and bilateral donors,
environmental organisations, and academic institutions. In spite of increasingly support,
insufficient technical training and legal support for Indigenous loggers and leaders
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continues to create major impediments to participatory or empowering development
methods. There has been an increasing urban and rural divide in the RAAN. Two
universities initiated since the early 1990s in the two regional seats and a few additional
municipal seats have improved capacity for resource management and strengthened
multiethnic political autonomy. However, while the quality and rigor of regional resource
management in these locations have improved tremendously, gains among regional
academic and political institutions are rarely felt in villages. Additional efforts need to be
made to bring these educational and technical improvements to rural areas.
Human resource development in marginalised, impoverished villages will require
long-term support. It was found in Alamikangban that illiteracy levels were as high as 36
percent, while another 48 percent of the population had only attended a few years of
primary school, but less than two percent of the population obtained an education beyond
high school (Brook 2005). On average, 43 percent of the population above the age of ten
in the Autonomous Regions is illiterate. Educational improvements will be necessary to
broaden employment opportunities within the forestry sector. While the national
requirement for professionally-trained foresters to write management plans to assure
technical quality are valid, there may need to be an additional process that guarantees
further involvement of broader stakeholders, particularly impacted villages. However,
this has been resisted within the government because it is argued that most villagers to
not have the educational capacity to make such decisions. Yet is still necessary for local
and regional populations to participate in determining culturally appropriate methods to
assure Indigenous decision-making, rather than receiving mandates that are poorly
matched with local institutions and livelihoods and thus foster additional conflict.
Multiscale solutions for land titling reform
The process of delineating, mapping, and titling Indigenous and Afro-descendent
territories is complex due to the various and multiple-scaled actors involved (Offen
2003b). While mapping may potentially generate new forms of conflict, transparent and
genuinely participatory mapping projects can also demonstrate customary cultural
relationship with land and communicate the specifics of human-environment interactions
in local livelihoods to previously uninformed national and international audiences
(Chapin and Threlkeld 2001; Herlihy and Knapp 2003).
Several land demarcation projects in Indigenous territories have received support
from international donors. In most instances, such as the World Bank’s Atlantic
Biological Corridor, Rural Municipalities, and Land Administration programmes, the
funding was largely administered through central government institutions where power
remained concentrated in spite of decentralisation shifts. All three of these programmes
had approximately five-year funding cycles; after offices closed, the knowledge and
experience that was garnered became dissipated. By 2003 there were some foreign aid
transfers directly to regional institutions, but financial inequities between state
institutions in the east and west continued. While RAAN responsibilities grew in number
and complexity, officials in charge of demarcation commonly experienced budget
shortfalls that made them less effective in resolving governance needs (pers. comm.
11/06/03, 01/09/07). Nevertheless, the situation was made worse by conflict between
political parties, ethnic groups and among the leaders of the North and South
Autonomous Regions.
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Insufficient training in dispute resolution is limiting factor. Regional agencies need to
resolve hundreds of contrasting claims between neighbouring jurisdictions, and between
new settlers and historical dwellers, that in some cases have advanced into armed
struggles. While the need for conflict resolution mechanisms as part of land management
and land demarcation programmes is clear, and receives brief mention in many academic
studies and foreign aid programmes, it remains underanalysed in Latin America in
comparison to work in Asia and Africa. Deininger (2005: 225) does note the need for
improved land administration to contribute to social peace in the region. His overarching
conflict resolution suggestions, although broad and preliminary, point to the need to
include communal institutions and empower local populations:
(a) development of an incentive structure that rewards the settlement of conflicts and
requires informal resolution as the first step;
(b) creation of a system of conflict monitoring and information distribution to
establish norms of acceptable behavior to assist individuals in resolving conflicts
on their own.
Formal mechanisms that are sensitive to local histories and differences have not been
developed for the RAAN. These would need to address issues of asymmetric power
relations, such as unequal representation between ethnic groups, as well as ensure crosschecks to neutralise the power of particular political and economic interest groups.
Mechanisms must also strengthen the monitoring and oversight of court and state
procedures and assure broad communication of rulings.
CONCLUSION
The 1987 Autonomy Statue and the 2003 Demarcation Law created new political
space for Indigenous leaders in regional and local institutions. To create additional hope
for equity and inclusion means requiring educational reforms and dispute resolution
procedures as well as encouraging accountability and transparency. Culturally sensitive
improvements will value local practices, such as public village assemblies, rather than
blindly impose external norms, such as signatures of one elected official permitting forest
extraction. Conservation programmes with Indigenous populations often disrupt
communal leadership systems and informal social networks as well as weaken cultural
identity (Colchester 2004). Similar impacts have been documented to have occurred from
national land and resource policy reforms in eastern Nicaragua, but Indigenous leaders in
subnational institutions have increasingly self-organised to stem further decay and to
target the implementation of the policy shifts with the potential to protect Indigenous
claims and increase participation. While this has proven to be a slow process, and the
degree of conflict between political parties, ethnic groups and neighboring villages has
often been discouraging, there is administrative experience building among a small group
of visionary and dedicated leaders. There have been subnational initiatives to respond to
incidences of sindiko corruption by reinforcing democratic electoral procedures and
helping villages remove leaders who refuse to step down or abuse their power for
personal gain. Regional and local NGOs educate people about what to characteristics
look for in an effective leader before election and what to expect from them during their
administration. RAAN-based programmes such as these that now currently exist in
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isolated pockets need to be supported and extended as an avenue to resolve resource and
tenure conflict and promote SFM through inclusive means.
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